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Abstract
Background Aspinwall and Tedeschi (Ann Behav Med,
2010) summarize evidence they view as supporting links
between positive psychological states, including sense of
coherence (SOC) and optimism and health outcomes, and
they refer to persistent assumptions that interfere with
understanding how positive states predict health.
Purpose We critically evaluate Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s
assertions.
Methods We examine evidence related to SOC and
optimism in relation to physical health, and revisit proposed
processes linking positive psychological states to health
outcomes, particularly via the immune system in cancer.
Results Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s assumptions regarding
SOC and optimism are at odds with available evidence.
Proposed pathways between positive psychological states
and cancer outcomes are not supported by existing data.
Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s portrayal of persistent interfering
assumptions echoes a disregard of precedent in the broader
positive psychology literature.
Conclusion Positive psychology’s interpretations of the
literature regarding positive psychological states and cancer
outcomes represent a self-perpetuating story line without
empirical support.
Keywords Positivepsychology.Cancer.Immune
functioning.Optimism.Senseofcoherence
Introduction
We appreciated the willingness of Lisa Aspinwall and
Richard Tedeschi [1] to debate applications of positive
psychology to cancer. Aspinwall and Tedeschi espouse
values that we consider vitally important to sustaining this
debate and to reconciling the claims of positive psychology
with a wealth of available evidence. We agree with their
position that investigators and theorists should not concep-
tualize “variables that have a ‘positive flavor’ as contained
within something called positive psychology” (in this issue;
quotation marks in original) and that, “[i]f we divide the
world into positive psychology and not” (in this issue), we
create barriers to discovery. Yet, we wonder how Aspinwall
and Tedeschi’s clarion call can be reconciled with positive
psychology’s “manifesto” [2], and with its “declaration of
independence” [3], coupled with adherents of positive
psychology regularly referring to it as a “movement,” as
well as with the many volumes with titles that include the
positive psychology rubric in which constructs studied long
before the “movement” began are appropriated for the very
purpose of containing them within something called
positive psychology.
Critical discussions of the potential contributions of a
positive psychology have been hampered by the slogan-
eering of the leaders of the movement and their labeling of
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particularly within cancer care, the alternative to optimism
as being pessimism. As Barbara Ehrenreich has repeatedly
cautioned us,
When it comes to how we think, “negative” is not the
only alternative to “positive.” As the case histories of
depressives show, consistent pessimism can be just as
baseless and deluded as its opposite. The alternative
to both is realism—seeing the risks, having the
courage to bear bad news and being prepared for
famine as well as plenty. We ought to give it a try [5].
We agree with Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s concern about
the dangers of popular versions of positive psychology with
its
...seemingly relentless emphasis on mandating
optimism, individual happiness, and personal
growth no matter the circumstances, is that the
general public may come to believe that one can
conquer cancer by thinking positively, and that if
one is not getting a good response, one is not
thinking positively enough, not laughing enough, or
not being spiritual enough (in this issue).
We applaud Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s[ 1] apt condem-
nation of "saccharine terrorism, victim-blaming, and the
promotion of mindless versions of positive thinking for
personal gain” (in this issue), yet, we wonder how this is
to be reconciled with the marketing of positive psychology
by the leaders of the movement who nonetheless claim a
grounding in scientific evidence. The ridiculing of
pessimists as losers in positive psychology self-help books
[4], money back guarantees on websites offering personal
coaches and self-help techniques claiming to promote
happiness, and the presentation of pseudoscientific happi-
ness regression equations H ¼ S þ C þ V Happiness ¼ ½ ð
your Set range þ the Circumstances of your life þ the
factors under your Voluntary control Þ [4] all seem appro-
priate targets of Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s condemnation
and suggest that, while the leaders of positive psychology
claim it to be science based, they feel free to deliver
platonic noble lies to the unwashed masses [6]. Perhaps,
we need a sharper distinction between the scientific
research program of positive psychology versus positive
psychology as a social movement with a closely associ-
ated marketing of self-help materials, personal coaching,
and training programs to the lay public, industry, and the
military [7, 8]. Scientific research programs require
adherence to standards of evidence that inevitably conflict
with what best serves social movements and marketing.
Moreover, leaders of positive psychology as a research
paradigm substantially overlap with its leaders as a
commercialized social movement, and so, outsiders are
left not knowing which standards to apply to their
pronouncements.
Most importantly, however, Aspinwall and Tedeschi
failed to confront directly the many negative consequences
of applying positive psychology to persons with cancer, the
key issue that inspired the original debate held at the
Society of Behavioral Medicine Annual Meeting in 2007.
To their credit, they declare at the outset opposition to
“popular views of positive thinking, such as its promotion
as a cure for cancer and other diseases.” Later, they concede
that the evidence is weaker or nonexistent that positive
psychological states affect progression of cancer or length
of survival time. We heartily agree. Yet, in condemning
“saccharine terrorism,” Aspinwall and Tedeschi fail to note
that support for such victim blaming can come not only
from the fringe, but from mainstream positive psychology.
Anyone who doubts this need only to Google “positive
psychology” and “coaching” and experiment by adding
some names of proponents of mainstream positive psychol-
ogy. They will soon be brought to websites with claims that
retaining a personal coach or engaging in web-based
exercises for a substantial fee is guaranteed to instill
happiness that lasts and that happiness is related to better
health. More efficiently, the skeptical reader can reach
websites with similar claims by simply joining the
American Psychological Association listserv Friends of
Positive Psychology that describes itself as devoted to the
“discussion of positive psychology in research and prac-
tice” [9] and by double clicking on the web links provided
in the signatures of posters there. The struggling cancer
patient is misled and understandably confused by such
claims. More troubling, Aspinwall and Tedeschi uncriti-
cally endorse as promising the links being drawn between
participation in group interventions for cancer patients and
improved immune functioning. In our previous paper [10],
we examined how unsubstantiated and even implausible
the causal links are that are claimed between changes in
the measures of immune functioning used in these studies
and progression and outcome of cancer. Yet, these claims
are directly marketed to cancer patients in press releases
from investigators (“Intervention program boosts survival
in breast cancer patients” [11]), despite careful analyses
showing that the interventions are ineffective in affecting
recurrence or survival [12].
We had sincerely hoped that Aspinwall and Tedeschi
would blindside us with contrary evidence to what we had
presented. We had carefully documented major conceptual
and methodological barriers to the establishment of unam-
biguous causal links between such concepts and health, but
we did not see Aspinwall and Tedeschi countering any of
these challenges or even acknowledging them, despite
citing some of the same sources on which we drew for
our critique [13].
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Precedent in Positive Psychology
Aspinwall and Tedeschi [1] refer to “pervasive and limiting
assumptions” that interfere with understanding the role of
positive psychological experiences in health and illness.
These unhelpful assumptions, such as that positive and
negative thoughts and feelings cannot coexist, that they
have symmetrical and opposite effects, and that positive
thoughts and feelings are pleasant but trivial, are apparently
just now being brought to light, and one might conclude
from Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s description that positive
psychology is removing the veil of ignorance from those of
us immersed in the “negative psychology” enterprise. Yet,
the historical record suggests otherwise.
The history of “negative psychology” makes it difficult
to believe that its adherents maintain a pervasive assump-
tion that positive and negative thoughts and feelings cannot
coexist or that positive thoughts and feelings are trivial.
Sixty years ago, Melanie Klein [14] referred to the capacity
to experience simultaneous positive and negative emotions
toward the same person as a developmental milestone and
an indicator of emotional maturity. Thirty five years ago,
Winnicott [15] referred to the experience of simultaneous
positive and negative thoughts and feelings toward another
person as “an achievement” (p. 262). In the same year,
Kernberg [16] underscored how well functioning indivi-
duals have the capacity to integrate positive and negative
aspects of themselves and others. Remarkably, the insights
of Klein, Winnicott, and Kernberg (and many others
including Elizabeth Zetzel, Edith Jacobson, and Heinz
Hartmann) regarding the inherent connections between
positive and negative emotions, states of mind, and self-
images emerged in the context of clinical practice and the
study of psychopathology.
These theorists’ ubiquitous influence on social and
behavioral sciences and the humanities and on Western
culture makes it difficult to imagine how the assumptions
described by Aspinwall and Tedeschi [1] could take hold,
let alone become pervasive. These widely known theorists
have had a profound influence on educators, clinicians,
philosophers, literary and cultural critics, and also the way
parents and researchers think about children. In view of
their prominent and lasting contributions to our current
understanding of the significance of positive thoughts and
feelings and the relationship of positive and negative states
of mind, their absence from Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s
extended discussion of these issues warrants analysis.
One possible explanation for Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s
exclusion of major precedents to positive psychology’s
position regarding positive thoughts and feelings is that the
past no longer plays a significant role in the scientific
imagination [17]. Another potential explanation is found in
positive psychology’s particular penchant for historical
revisionism, which has not gone unnoticed (e.g., [18–20]).
We believe that positive psychology’s persistent refusal to
seek and embrace precedent, except at the most superficial
level, is captured in Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s analysis of
“persistent and limiting assumptions” and reflects an
attitude with significant implications for how positive
psychology approaches its mission. Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s
exclusion of major precedents to positive psychology’sv i e w
of positive thoughts and feelings is not an isolated oversight.
Rather, it reflects a persistent tendency—the same tendency
that has prevented positive psychology adherents from
considering the vast evidence cited by Coyne and Tennen
[10]( s e ea l s o[ 21]) demonstrating that positive psychology’s
view of benefit finding is speculative, that current indicators
of posttraumatic growth are almost certainly invalid, and the
implausibilityofclaimsthatinterventionsthatenhancebenefit
finding improve the prognosis of cancer patients by strength-
ening the immune system. Indeed, virtually, every criticism of
positive psychology offered by Coyne and Tennen can be
traced directly to the pervasive albeit implicit belief among
many positive psychology adherents that precedent, espe-
cially precedent from “negative social science” is irrelevant.
In the absence of a concerted effort among adherents, and
especially from its leadership, this recurrent disregard of
precedent threatens to undermine positive psychology and
become one of its unintended legacies.
Sense of Coherence and Optimism in Positive
Psychology
Because the topics of benefit finding and posttraumatic
growth were addressed in both Aspinwall and Tedeschi [1]
and our article [10], these concepts provide the greatest
opportunity to compare and contrast our positions, and we
invite readers to try to reconcile our sharply differing
positions. Yet, we were surprised that Aspinwall and
Tedeschi chose additionally to single out SOC and
optimism as positive psychology-tinged concepts with
robust associations to health. Our assessment of SOC is
that it is mainly of historical interest, except as it points to
likely bumps in the road for research with other key
concepts of positive psychology. The concept of optimism,
while still enjoying considerable well-deserved attention
because of its established links to emotional well-being and
health behaviors, falls prey to the conceptual and method-
ological issues we raised in our paper more generally about
establishing unambiguous, clinically useful causal associa-
tions between psychological states and physical health (see
also [13]). Moreover, with optimism construed as a stable,
relatively immutable trait, it is not at all clear how it is
relevant to intervention, except perhaps as a plausible, but
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account in tailoring interventions.
Sense of Coherence
The study of SOC started with great promise, but ultimately
yielded few unambiguous connections with physical health,
particularly as assessed by objective rather than subjective
indicators. A few studies reported associations between SOC
andobjectivehealthindicators[22–24]. However, substantive
interpretations of these findings have been challenged on
conceptual [25] and methodological grounds [26]. Namely,
the three item SOC measure used in the Surtees et al. study
[22] was unreliable and only modestly related to longer
measures of SOC [27]. Moreover, the measure was
confounded with baseline health and environmentally pro-
vided social resources. Even subscales of the longer versions
of the scale are correlated with measures of depression and
anxiety as much as their respective reliabilities allow [27]. In
studies drawing on the same dataset, one reported a
significant association between SOC and cancer incidence
at 8-year follow-up but not at 12-year follow-up [23]; while
another reported a link between SOC and risk of external
injuries [24]. No plausible underlying mechanism can link
SOC to both incidence of cancer and external injuries, but
not other physical health outcomes, and so both associations
may be spurious, and as MacLeod et al. [26]s u g g e s t e d ,
simply due to the use of imprecise measures of potential
confounders, limiting statistical adjustment. A negative
assessment of the predictive value of SOC for health was
further confirmed in a systematic review [28]. Overall,
questions have been raised regarding whether existing
measures correspond well to Antonovsky’s original theoret-
ical description of SOC, whether any association with
physical health might represent reverse causality [29]a n d
whether, given the strong negative correlations between SOC
and measures of depression and anxiety, SOC merely
represents “negative psychology” turned on its head.
Notably missing in this literature is any examination of
whether baseline physical health predicts subsequent SOC,
independent of baseline SOC, although some data sets would
seem to allow this association to be tested.
Optimism
Aspinwall and Tedeschi discuss the association between
optimism and health in two noncontiguous paragraphs. In
the first paragraph, they cite a study of optimism and survival
in head and neck cancer in support of an association between
optimism and survival [30]. Yet, in the second paragraph,
they note that associations between optimism and cancer
mortality are more generally weak or nonsignificant.
Examining the study of head and neck cancer patients, we
note that it was a small, underpowered investigation (45 deaths
being explained), the lower limit of the confidence interval
barely excluded 1.0 (confidence interval=1.01−1.24), and
even this effect depended upon multivariate analyses inappro-
priate for such a small number of deaths being explained.
We can underscore that the association between positive
psychological traits and states and cancer incidence or
mortality is small or nonexistent with references to recent
studies. A well-controlled study of the survival of head and
neck patients with an ample number of deaths being
explained, 646, found no evidence of an association between
emotional well-being and survival in simple or multivariate
analyses, despite an exhaustive search for main or interaction
effects [31]. Tindle et al. [32] examined mortality in a
Women’s Health Initiative cohort of 97,253 women, 7,994 of
them African-American. Optimism did not predict cancer-
related mortality in the full sample or among white women,
but it did predict cancer-related mortality among African-
American women. We might be tempted to single out the
apparent positive finding for African-American women, but
then, we must ask what a priori explanation is there for the
association not holding for white women or the full sample,
but only for African-Americans? Moreover, mortality was
more related to a full range of background factors and
strongly related to depressive symptoms. Risk factors other
than optimism were entered as statistical controls for the
prediction of cancer-related mortality by optimism, but the
categorization of these variables for entry into the multiva-
riate proportional hazards was crude, and still allowed for
residual confounding (for a discussion of this issue, see our
earlier paper [10] as well as the humorous, but insightful
article by Davey Smith and Ebrahim [33]). Finally, given the
strong negative association between optimism and depres-
sive symptoms, it is not clear whether the prediction of
mortality from depressive symptoms controlling for opti-
mism would not have been stronger than the investigators’
preferred prediction of mortality from optimism controlling
for depressive symptoms.
Aspinwall and Tedeschi dismiss the possibility that the
relation between positive states and health outcomes can be
explained by the “detrimental effects of either pessimistic
expectations or state or trait forms of negative affect, such as
distress, depression, or anger” (in this issue). They cite a
recent systematic review and meta-analysis of the association
between optimism and physical health [34]. Yet, in this
review, Rasmussen et al. actually found that pessimism
predicted health outcomes as well as or better than optimism,
raising questions as to why optimism should be favored.
Aspinwall and Tedeschi indicate that even if an association
between positive thoughts and feelings and mortality cannot
be demonstrated for cancer, it has been established for
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and meta-analysis by Chida and Steptoe [35]. At first glance,
the review does indeed give that impression, and so deserves
a closer look. For cardiac mortality occurring in nonpatient
samples, Chida and Steptoe included six effect sizes (see
their Table 1), but two came from the same study, violating
basic assumptions of meta-analysis. Chida and Steptoe also
found overall highly significant statistical heterogeneity in the
effect sizes of the studies included in their analyses of
nonpatient samples and significant publication bias. Examining
their Fig. 2, it is clear that the statistical heterogeneity comes
largely from a strong publication bias, whereby published
small, underpowered studies nonetheless yield larger effect
sizes than larger studies. Indeed, none of the larger studies
produced a significant association between positive psycho-
logical variables and cardiac mortality. For persons already
diagnosed with cardiac disease, the picture is confusing (their
Table 2): there are five effect sizes entered into the meta-
analysis, two from the same study, and of the five, two are not
significant, one is significant in the right direction, but two are
significant in the wrong direction, with higher scores on
positive well-being associated with greater mortality.
No doubt that associations between positive psychology
variables and reduced cardiac mortality can sometimes be
found in some studies, as in the Women’s Health Initiative for
whitewomen,butnotinthesampleof 7,994African-American
women [32]. Note the contradiction of these findings with the
ones obtained for cancer in the same sample. Yet, overall, the
association has a will-o’-the-wisp quality, leaving “serious
conceptual and methodological reservations” [13,p .9 6 0 ]
about any substantive interpretations, and little obvious public
health or clinical implications. Moreover, as Chida and
Steptoe [35] indicate, there is a significant publication bias
in favor of positive findings, and a perusal of the positive
psychology and health literature indicates a persistent ampli-
fication of any signals of an association. Why has so much
importance been attached to demonstrating that optimism
predicts health and mortality? Such claims have taken on an
ideological importance and are resistant to null and inconsis-
tent findings. The notion that being optimistic improves health
is invoked in promoting positive psychology intervention
research and in the marketing of positive psychology as a
commercial enterprise, even if, ironically, optimism is
theoretically a relatively immutable trait.
Linking Positive Psychological States to the Physical
Health Outcomes of Cancer
Aspinwall and Tedeschi [1] cite direct links between
positive psychological states and physiological processes
and especially the immune system in cancer. We find this
unfortunate and counter to best evidence. As we reviewed
in our opening paper [10], existing data support even less
of a role for stress, social support, and positive psycho-
logical states in the progression and outcome of cancer
than for other chronic and life-threatening conditions. As
we also reviewed, there is no evidence that attitude or
personality matter for the outcome of cancer or that
psychosocial interventions can improve survival. Claims
about links between positive psychological states and
progression and outcome of cancer depend on unproven
and dubious causal links between the parameters of the
immune system studied in psychoneuroimmunology (PNI)
and biomedical outcomes [10].
Aspinwall and Tedeschi and others in positive psycho-
logy seem not to see through a substantial confirmatory
bias in this literature. As long as results can be published in
high impact journals with no a priori hypotheses, and
investigators can emphasize whatever significant effects
can be gleaned from a full range of biological assessments
chosen on the basis of convenience and not demonstrated
clinical relevance; and as long as null findings or contra-
dictions by past research are ignored, the literature
concerning PNI functioning can continue to convey
illusions of promise and scientific progress in combating
cancer. Yet, the likelihood is low of a yield in psychological
interventions improving patient survival. For instance,
survival rates for early breast cancer patients under
conditions of standard care are so high that it would be
difficult to demonstrate a clinically significant improvement
without a powerful treatment and a sample size of
thousands [36, 37]. On the other hand, survival rates for
metastatic cancer remain low and relatively resistant to
change over decades [38]. In neither patient population
does the strength of existing findings, coupled with a lack
of demonstration of a possible mechanism of effect justify
the commitment of resources to large-scale studies [39].
Bringing Evidence to Bear on Story Lines About
Positive Psychology and Cancer: And Why Cancer?
Positive psychology offers what at first appears to be testable
hypotheses about positive psychological states and cancer:
that cancer can be influenced by an attitude of fighting spirit,
positive coping and positive expression offeelings, optimism,
and social support and that psychological interventions
influence biomedical outcomes in cancer via strengthening
the immune system. Yet, as indicated by a close look at the
articles cited by Aspinwall and Tedeschi and elsewhere, these
assertions are quite resistant to evidence and function more
like story lines of a movement [40], not falsifiable hypoth-
eses. As seen in their resistance to data, story lines are
oversimplifying: regardless of data to the contrary they are
preserved intact for application in persistent advocacy for
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perpetuating, confronting new data with a strong confirma-
tory bias, exaggerating the consistency of any new data with
the storyline, and keeping out potentially disconfirming data.
Story lines often have the quality of a promissory note
preserved in a time capsule, having given favorable data
more credence than is yet justified while uninfluenced by the
weight of subsequent accumulating evidence.
It is noteworthy that, within positive psychology, there is so
little acknowledgment of the fundamental issues we have
raised here and in our first paper, and besides this exchange
with Aspinwall and Tedeschi, there is so little debate within
positive psychology or with its critics and skeptics. If appeals
to scientific evidenceare to continueto bemade,it is high time
thattherebewideracknowledgmentof(a)thelackof evidence
connecting positive psychological states to the biology of
cancer, (b) acknowledgment of the consistent evidence that
psychological interventions do not prolong survival, and (c)
that any causal links remain to be established between the
parameters of immune function studied in relation to positive
psychological states and psychological interventions.
In important respects, it is odd that positive psychology as
applied tohealthand illness has becomeso focused on cancer.
Evidence is weakest for any link between personality, stress,
or positive psychological factors and biological parameters of
cancer, relative to other chronic diseases. In terms of the
adaptational value of fighting spirit and existential courage,
heart failure would seem a better candidate than breast cancer.
Women who are diagnosed with chronic heart failure on
average face shorter life expectancy, more rapidly increasing
disease burden and a steeper decline in quality of life than
women diagnosed with breast cancer. The regimen for
managing heart failure is much more intrusive and complex
and unforgiving of noncompliance. Management indeed
represents a struggle in which despair has negative con-
sequences: a single act of dietary noncompliance carrying the
possibility of a trip to the emergency room or death. Yet, we
are unaware of exhortations to women with heart failure to
adopt a fighting spirit paralleling the pressures on breast
cancer patients or a sense that the survival of these women is
heroic in the same way that the survival of breast cancer
patients is portrayed. We are not encouraging burdening
women with heart failure with demands for positive thinking
as women with breast cancer have been, but we do suggest
that perhaps heart failure is a better focus than cancer.
Positive Psychology or a Diversified Human Psychology
of Cancer?
AlthoughweagreewithAspinwallandTedeschithatacademic
positive psychology should not have to shoulder the blame for
cultural phenomena such as The Secret, there are some
negative consequences of positive psychology to be owned.
Persons who have been diagnosed with cancer often provide
poignant accounts of pressures to be positive lest they risk
decreasing their chances of survival [41, 42]. Positive
psychology needs to shoulder some of the blame for claiming
to offer scientific evidence that attitude and strength of
character matter for the physical health outcomes of cancer.
Any psychology of cancer needs to acknowledge greater
diversity in the experience of the disease and in the forms
adaptive coping can take. Chronic distress and clinical
depression in the face of cancer require empirically based
intervention, but there is need for a balancing recognition that
transient periods of distress and despair are normative and for
many persons, may be a necessary part of positive adaptation
to the cancer experience. Acceptance of diversity in human
response to cancer allows room for the iconic image of Lance
Armstrong as a heroic cancer survivor who declares that
cancer made him a better person. But it also allows for the
alternative image provided by Olympic gold medal winner
Maarten Van der Weijden. The Dutch swimmer requests that
no one confuse him with Lance Armstrong. And he adds
“Armstrong describes his battle, how he was fighting, how he
felt that he expelled the cancer cells from his body. What he
basically says is thatitisyourown fault whenyou don’tm a k e
it. That you didn’t fight hard enough" said van der Weijden.
"When my cancer was diagnosed, I laid down in the hospital
and simply surrendered to the doctors. You always hear those
stories that you have to think positively, that you have to fight
to survive.This can be a great burden for patients. Ithas never
been proven that you can cure from cancer by thinking
positively or by fighting” [43].
Conclusion
We reiterate our appreciation of Aspinwall and Tedeschi’s
willingness to engage in this debate. We began preparation
for this debate with a certain degree of skepticism about the
claims of positive psychology, honed by previous close
readings of these claims and their discrepancy with
available data [12, 39]. We found in Aspinwall and
Tedeschi’s first article [1] an unusual degree of acknow-
ledgement of some of these discrepancies, especially
compared to how the data are presented in the broader
literature concerning positive psychology and health.
Where we took issue with Aspinwall and Tedeschi was
mainly with their uncritical acceptance of the claims made
in the literature, which we have shown to be biased in
publication of positive findings, regardless of the quality of
studies, biased in its portrayal of findings in subsequent
publications, and exclusion of null and negative findings.
Taken together, our earlier paper and this rebuttal demon-
strate a strong need for a close reading of the literature
40 ann. behav. med. (2010) 39:35–42concerning positive psychology and health with skepticism
and a willingness to go and search for evidence available
elsewhere but excluded from the positive psychology
literature. We agree with Aspinwall and Tedeschi’sc a l lf o r
adherents of positive psychology testing their claims in
debates with skeptics. But we think it is more important that
the “movement” internally tolerate more dissent and struggle
more with evidence seemingly in conflict with its claims. The
dominant approach to evidence has been to find whatever fits
with the needs of the movement, regardless of the evidence’s
quality or the availability of discrepant data. We believe that
preservation of the scientific integrity and basic credibility of
positive psychology, especially its applications to persons
with cancer, depends on it shifting from seeking all the
evidence that fits its message to adopting more sophisticated
search, evaluation, integration, and interpretation strategies
consistent with a “best evidence” perspective.
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